Voluntary Agreements and Non-Verifiable Emissions
نویسنده
چکیده
If pollution is observable, but some emissions cannot be verified by court, voluntary agreements between a regulator and an industry can be welfareimproving compared to second-best emission taxes. Such agreements differ from direct regulation in a non-trivial way. The first-best optimum may be included in the set of possible agreements, even if it is not attainable using tax instruments. The non-verifiability may, for example, be associated with delimitation problems in defining the pollution tax base.
منابع مشابه
Voluntary agreements between government and business - a scoping review of the literature with specific reference to the Public Health Responsibility Deal.
OBJECTIVES A scoping review was conducted to synthesise the findings of evaluations of voluntary agreements between business and government. It aimed to summarise the types of agreements that exist, how they work in practice, the conditions for their success and how they had been evaluated. METHODS Voluntary agreements were included if they involved a transparent signing-up process and where ...
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