The revelation principle and regularity conditions
نویسنده
چکیده
The revelation principle asserts that every outcome brought by a mechanism is realized by a truthful direct mechanism. The present paper investigates the regularity conditions of these two mechanisms in the continuous space of the agent’s type. It questions what regularity condition a general mechanism confers upon a direct mechanism through the revelation principle. By so doing, we elucidate the limit of the revelation principle. JEL Classification: D82
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