UKRAINE ' S FLAWED NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY by Steven

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1994 Dr. Steven E. Miller is Director of the International Security Program at the Center for Science and International Affairs of the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, and Editor-in-Chief of the journal International Security. In December 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker visited Kiev to consult with the leaders of newly independent Ukraine. Nuclear weapons figured prominently in these discussions. President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine agreed that the withdrawal of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons from Ukrainian soil would commence immediately; and he assured Secretary of State Baker that Ukraine was firmly committed to becoming a non-nuclear weapon state. The American delegation left Ukraine feeling that the visit had been a success and that the nuclear weapons issue had been addressed in a satisfactory fashion.1 After this relatively promising beginning, however, the road has been far from smooth. To be sure, Ukrainian leaders have on numerous occasions reiterated the pledge to denuclearize. But the period since December 1991 has not witnessed the final resolution of the denuclearization issue in Ukraine, and Kiev’s ultimate nuclear status remains in doubt. From the American perspective, Ukraine’s behavior on the nuclear issue has been evasive, ambiguous, and frustrating. Thus, the U.S.-Ukrainian negotiations to reach an umbrella agreement that would permit the provision of U.S. denuclearization assistance dragged on for more than a year, and agreement was not reached until October 1993; Kiev’s delaying tactics, which blocked the provision of U.S. assistance to Ukraine, appeared to Washington to reflect a desire to stall the denuclearization process. Similarly, the Lisbon Protocol of May 1992 made Ukraine a party to the START I agreement, but it was not until November 1993 that the Ukrainian Rada, under strong international pressure, finally ratified START. Even then, it did so in a conditional manner that both Russia and the United States found unacceptable. Only in February of 1994 did Ukraine finally pass an acceptable START instrument of ratification. Meanwhile, Ukraine has yet to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and its failure to do so prevents the entry into force of START I. In short, Ukraine has combined the rhetoric of denuclearization with behavior that has raised doubts about the sincerity of its commitment to become a non-nuclear state. There are a number of plausible explanations for Ukraine’s ambiguous nuclear policy. One is that its commitment to denuclearize is sincere, but implementation of this commitment is hindered by a variety of practical and political difficulties. A second interpretation suggests that Ukraine has not made a firm and final decision to become a nuclear weapon state, but for the time being does not wish to foreclose the option to do so. A third possible explanation of Ukraine’s ambiguous nuclear behavior is that Ukraine wishes to become a nuclear-armed power but is not yet prepared to face the international consequences of unambiguously embracing the nuclear option. Finally, a fourth argument is that the nuclear weapons on Ukraine’s territory constitute potent bargaining chips, and that Kiev has understandably sought, in its nuclear diplomacy, to get as much as possible for these weapons before it gives them up. This approach is all the more irresistible—and all the more comprehensible—because Ukraine has few other sources of leverage in its interactions with Moscow and the West. Doubts about Ukraine’s nuclear intentions derive from the fact that the evidence so far does not exclude any of these interpretations. Further, all four of these approaches are represented in the Ukrainian debate on nuclear policy. This essay assesses the merits of the “bargaining chip” explanation, the one most often cited in the West to explain Ukraine’s nuclear diplomacy. VIEWPOINT: