Bayesian Implementation in Crowdsourced Auctions

نویسندگان

  • Chetan Rao
  • Shuchi Chawla
چکیده

From the early days of mankind, the problem of collective decision making in a society where information is dispersed among the members of the society has been a challenging one. Many civilizations have perished, or more recently, governments have taken a downturn due to bad, uninformed policies. Numerous other social, political and economical decisions ranging from voting for political representatives to trading in a market require making decisions collectively. The design of institutions through which individuals interact, play a key role in the decision process. The study of implementation theory deals with the design of specific institutions which bring about socially ‘desirable’ outcome, given the individual preferences.

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تاریخ انتشار 2012