A bio-objects approach to biosecurity: the “mutant flu” controversy as a bio-objectification process

The governance of biological emergencies has been an important issue during the last decade. Much policy work has been done on the topic, aiming at covering the necessities associated to bio-preparedness – ie, preparedness for biological threats. In this context, there is a lot to be said and understood by looking at emerging biological entities, such as new viruses or bacteria. Some of the most important international organizations worry about this issue: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), World Health Organization (WHO), or European Union (EU) have specific sections specialized in dealing with this matter. Such concern has been fed by the expert opinion asserting that a big pandemic is imminent. This is based on several developments that have taken place during the last decades: the 80s saw the expansion of Ebola and HIV, and the 90s and 2000s witnessed the appearance of the Creutzfeld-Jacob’s disease, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SRAS), and different types of influenza viruses coming from other species, such as the avian influenza or the H1N1. These outbreaks, together with the Anthrax attacks that took place in the aftermath of 9/11 and the research on genetic engineering of viruses has led to a general state of fear of biological threats. Such events are characterized by a strong interaction between the social and the biological, between populations and viruses. I suggest that conceptualizing viruses as bio-objects will be helpful in our attempt to understand such interaction.