Correction: Forgiver Triumphs in Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present additional results for the alternating Prisoner’s Dilemma where each player can either cooperate or defect in response to the last move of the opponent. We recall that a cooperating player incurs a cost c resulting in a benefit b for the other player (0 < c < b). Hence, summing over two consecutive moves, if both players cooperate, each one receives a payoff of b − c ; if both defect, they are left with nothing. If one player cooperates and the other player defects, the cooperator receives the lowest payoff of −c and the defector receives the highest payoff of b. We obtain the following payoff matrix:
منابع مشابه
Forgiver Triumphs in Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma
Cooperative behavior, where one individual incurs a cost to help another, is a wide spread phenomenon. Here we study direct reciprocity in the context of the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma. We consider all strategies that can be implemented by one and two-state automata. We calculate the payoff matrix of all pairwise encounters in the presence of noise. We explore deterministic selection dynami...
متن کاملOptimality under noise: higher memory strategies for the alternating prisoner's dilemma.
The Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma is a variant of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in which the players alternate in the roles of actor and recipient. We searched for strategies which are "optimal" in the Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma with noise (a non-zero probability that a player's decision will be transmitted incorrectly). In order to achieve success against a variety of other strategies, ...
متن کاملProtocols for Cooperation Cultural Diversity of Strategies for the Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma
The Prisoner's Dilemma has long been the paradigm for modeling cooperation in a competitive environment. The classical version, in which both agents simultaneously choose to cooperate or to defect, is unnecessarily artificial. The stochastic Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma in which choices are made sequentially and mistakes are possible is more faithful to examples in the real world. Intelligent...
متن کاملEvolutionary Dynamics in Game-Theoretic Models
A number of evolutionary models based on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with noise are discussed. Different aspects of the evolutionary behaviour are illustrated (i) by varying the trickiness of the game (iterated game, mistakes, misunderstandings, choice of payoff matrix), (ii) by introducing spatial dimensions, and (iii) by modifying the strategy space and the representation of strategies. O...
متن کاملEvolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity in repeated dyadic games.
A genetic algorithm incorporating mutation and crossing-over was used to investigate the evolution of social behaviour in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken (Hawk-Dove), Battle of the Sexes, and Leader games. The results show that the strategic structure of an interaction has a crucial determining effect on the type of social behaviour that evolves. In particular, simulations using repeated P...
متن کامل