A kind of “mental geography”: Remarks on Hume’s science of human nature

Most of Hume’s philosophy hinges on the project of founding a new “science of human nature”, mirrored in the successful “experimental method of reasoning” introduced in natural philosophy by Galileo, Newton and their contemporaries. In this essay I make some remarks on this project, with a view to elucidating its nature and exploring its potential fertility in the study of the human mind. I begin by showing that Hume carefully demarcates the domain in which the new method is applicable, namely, the domain of unobserved matters of fact. I argue that, given his conclusions about the narrow limits of the traditional, a priori philosophical method, naturalism is Hume’s favoured instrument for advancing research in this domain. Then, I draw attention to the epistemic priority that Hume ascribes to the phenomenological level, both in the natural sciences and in his science of man. I argue that he had good reasons not only for making this choice, but also for holding that the phenomena forming the basis of a naturalistic theory of mind should be specifically mental. This is in sharp contrast with the typical forms of epistemological naturalism prevalent in our days, which seek to establish the science of mind either on a behaviouristic basis, or on the theoretical study of neurological processes. In the final section of the article, I consider briefly one of the most difficult questions raised by the adoption of a naturalistic approach in epistemology: whether naturalism leaves room to epistemic norms. I defend the view that the Humean version of naturalism is compatible with a moderate form of normativity in epistemology.