How much income redistribution? An explanation based on vote-buying and corruption
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper studies how income tax rates are determined and how they are related to government corruption in the form of fund capture. A model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters. In equilibrium there is only limited redistribution and income tax rates are a negative function of government corruption. When rich voters can bribe the government, an additional equilibrium with zero taxation is possible. The link between corruption and tax rates is tested using cross country data; the empirical evidence is fully consistent with the predictions of the model. This version: December 21, 2009 (Paper forthcoming in Public Choice) JEL classification: D72, D73, H2, H3
منابع مشابه
Strategies of Single Party Hegemony in Tanzania: Evidence from Survey Experiments
How do single party regimes maintain enduring political dominance in developing countries when democracy is formally enshrined and elections are largely free and fair? This paper uses evidence from two survey experiments and one natural or quasi-experiment to show how this works in Tanzania. First, we show that the ruling party still maintains the massive infrastructure of neighborhood represen...
متن کاملVoting on Income Redistribution: How a Little Bit of Altruism Creates Transitivity
We consider an election that is solely concerned with redistribution of income. It is well known that when voters are selfish, there is no political equilibrium. We consider the case where voters are modestly altruistic. We demonstrate that modest altruism results in a unique political equilibrium. We also provide an explanation for why voters are much more altruistic than individuals acting al...
متن کاملHow Do Rules and Institutions Encourage Vote Buying?
terms of both its causes and its consequences. Chapter 3 discusses a variety of conditions that lead to a market for votes, including the availability of cost-efficient alternatives to vote buying. In this chapter, I explore a few of the political and institutional factors that can make vote buying a more or less attractive strategy for parties and candidates vis-à-vis some of these alternative...
متن کاملCorruption and the Environmental Kuznets Curve in Developed and Developing Countries
This study examines the relationship between per capita income and per capita dioxide emissions in the form of a new definition of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, to investigate how corruption influences the income level at the turning point of the relationship between per capita dioxide emissions and income, in developed and developing countries the period 1994-2013 through the use of a panel...
متن کاملOur Blind Spots in the Fight Against Health Systems Corruption; Comment on “We Need to Talk About Corruption in Health Systems”
The health sector often appears prominent in surveys of perceived corruption, because citizens experience the symptoms of systemic corruption most distressingly during their interaction with frontline health workers. However, the underlying drivers of systemic corruption in society may be located in other social systems with the health system demonstrating the symptoms ...
متن کامل