Course : Algorithmic Game Theory VU University Amsterdam Lecture 11

نویسنده

  • Guido Schäfer
چکیده

Intuitively, player i is only interested in getting the items in Σi (or some more) and its valuation for these items is θi. Note that in the single-minded case every player simply reports a pair (Si,bi) (not necessarily equal to (Σi,θi)) to the auctioneer. Thus, the input can be represented compactly and is polynomial in n and m. The allocation problem for the single-minded case is as follows: Given the bids {(Si,bi)i∈N}, determine a subset W ⊆ N of winners such that Si∩S j = / 0 for every i, j ∈W , i 6= j, with maximum social welfare ∑i∈W bi.

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تاریخ انتشار 2010