Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests
نویسندگان
چکیده
Competition between groups often involves prizes that have both a public and a private component. The exact nature of the prize not only affects the strategic choice of the sharing rules determining its allocation but also gives rise to an interesting phenomenon not observed when the prize is either purely public or purely private. Indeed, we show that in the two-groups contest, for most degrees of privateness of the prize, the large group uses its sharing rule as a mean to exclude the small group from the competition, a situation called monopolization. Conversely, there is a degree of relative privateness above which the small group, besides being active, even outperforms the large group in terms of winning probabilities, giving rise to the celebrated group size paradox.
منابع مشابه
Cycles in Team Tennis and Other Paired-Element Contests
Team Tennis competitions produce aggregate scores for teams, and thus team rankings, based on head-to-head matchups of individual team members. Similar scoring rules can be used to rank any two groups that must be compared on the basis of paired elements. We explore such rules in terms of their strategic and social choice characteristics, with particular emphasis on the role of cycles. We first...
متن کاملIntra-group heterogeneity in collective contests
Collective contests are examined permitting heterogeneity of stakes within every competing group. Our first concern is whether unequal distribution of stakes in a group can enhance its win probability. Our second concern is whether a large stake in a group can be individually disadvantageous. We find that if a contest is sufficiently “hard” for a group, the answers to these questions are positi...
متن کاملStrategic reasoning in p-beauty contests
This paper analyzes strategic choice in p-beauty contests. First, I show that it is not generally a best reply to guess the expected target value, even in games with n > 2 players, and that iterated best response sequences strictly applied do not induce a choice sequence approximating pk · 0.5. Second, I argue that the beliefs and actions of players typically considered to be level 2–4 are capt...
متن کاملLeadership in Collective Action
We merge the current approach to collective action failure based on free-riding (Olson, 1965) with the previous approach focusing on the distortions created by the need of leaders (Michels, 1911 and Max Weber, 1918). Group goals and incentives are set by leaders in view to maximize the probability of success —rather than the group expected payoff. In spite of not being group optimal, success ma...
متن کاملCollective risk aversion
In this paper we analyze the risk attitude of a group of heterogeneous agents and we develop a theory of comparative collective risk tolerance. In particular, we characterize how shifts in the distribution of individual levels of risk tolerance affect the group’s attitude towards risk. In a model with effi cient risk-sharing and two agents an increase in the level of risk tolerance of one or of...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 46 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016