The computation of approximate competitive equilibrium is PPAD-hard
نویسندگان
چکیده
Arrow and Debreu showed in 1954 that, under mild conditions, a competitive economy always has an equilibrium. In this paper, we show that, given a competitive economy that fully respects all the conditions of Arrow-Debreu’s existence theorem, for any positive constant h > 0, it is PPAD-hard to compute a 1 nh -approximate competitive equilibrium.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Inf. Process. Lett.
دوره 108 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008