Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
نویسنده
چکیده
We extend the result from Bossert and Sprumont (2013) that every single-valued choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable via strict preferences to the case of choice correspondences via weak preferences. JEL Classification Numbers: C72; D70
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Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 88 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014