Colin Mayer : Firm Commitment
نویسندگان
چکیده
In his latest book “Firm Commitment” Colin Mayer argues that current-shareholder value orientation leads to the exploitation of both current as well as future stakeholder groups. Drawing on research conducted throughout his entire career, Mayer asserts that market processes distort resources operating to the exploitation of stakeholders to those who have the most opportunity to use them—current shareholders of corporations. According to Mayer, factors that have facilitated the shareholders’ opportunity to obtain such a position are reputation, hostile take-overs and imprudent regulation. However, not only will shareholders guide their corporation’s resources to fund activities that harm current and future stakeholders (i.e. all stakeholders excluding current, but including future shareholders), but also will this behaviour be anticipated by these stakeholder groups. They will subsequently refuse to invest capital into, or in other words not commit, to such a corporation. This lack of commitment is harmful to all parties involved, including current shareholders. Mayer proposes corporate structures designed to overcome it.
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