Jamming game with incomplete information about the jammer

In the present work we deal with the concept of jamming with incomplete information about the jammer. We consider two scenarios. In the first one a jammer could be either present in the environment bringing extra background noise or absent. The user has only statistical knowledge about either presence or absence of the jammer. Namely, the user knows that in the environment only a natural background noise could be with probability γ meanwhile with probability 1 − γ a jammer could come into the action distributing an extra noise of the total power J̄ among the channels. In the second scenario the user does not know exactly the total jamming power. Namely, the user knows that with probability γ it could be J̄ and with probability 1− γ it could be J̄. All the problems are modelled as non-zero sum games. The equilibrium strategies are found in closed form.