A note on the existence of Berge and Berge-Nash equilibria

نویسندگان

  • Moussa Larbani
  • Rabia Nessah
چکیده

This paper deals with the problem of existence of Berge and Berge–Nash equilibria. Abalo and Kostreva have proved existence theorems of Berge and Berge–Nash equilibria for S-equi-well-posed and (S, σ)equi-well-posed games, namely, Theorems 3.2–3.3 [Abalo, K.Y., Kostreva, M.M., 1996. Fixed Points, Nash Games and their Organization. Topological Methods in Nonlinear Analysis 8, 205–215.]. In this paper we show that the assumptions of these theorems are actually not sufficient for the existence of Berge equilibrium. We then propose a new version of these theorems. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Berge-Vaisman and Nash Equilibria: Transformation of Games

In this paper we reconsider the concept of Berge equilibrium. In a recent work, [Colman, A. M., Körner, T., Musy, O. and Tazdaït, T. [2011] Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria, Journal of Mathematical Psychology 55, 166–175]. proposed a correspondence for two-player games between Berge and Nash equilibria by permutation of the utility functions. We define here more gene...

متن کامل

Complementarities and the existence of strong Berge equilibrium

This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities à la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing.

متن کامل

Equilibria Detection in Non-cooperative Game Theory. An Evolutionary Approach

The most important task in non-cooperative Game Theory is the equilibria detection. A computational method is presented in order to detect different types of equilibria. The method is based on generative relations. Generative relations are an algebraic tool for describing game equilibria. The generative relations of Nash, Aumann, Berge-Zhukovskii, Pareto and Lorenz equilibria are presented. The...

متن کامل

On a Generalized Berge Strong Equilibrium

In this paper, we first introduce a generalized concept of Berge strong equilibrium for a generalized game G = (Xi; Ti, fi)i∈I of normal form, and using a fixed point theorem for compact acyclic maps in admissible convex sets, we establish the existence theorem of generalized Berge strong equilibrium for the game G with acyclic values. Also, we have demonstrated by examples that our new approac...

متن کامل

Characterization and Detection of epsilon-Berge Zhukovskii Equilibria

Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii (Berge-Zhukovskii) is an alternate solution concept in non-cooperative game theory that formalizes cooperation in a noncooperative setting. In this paper the -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium is introduced and characterized by using a generative relation. A computational method for detecting -Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium based on evolutionary multiobject...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • Mathematical Social Sciences

دوره 55  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2008