Can Corruption Foster Regulation Compliance?
نویسنده
چکیده
The legal and the economic literatures overwhelmingly support the notion that regulation compliance is always lower in the presence of corruption. This paper departs from those literatures and shows that an increase in corruption may actually foster regulation compliance. The conditions that make this possible are laid down in a theoretical model. The evidence that corroborates the theoretical ndings is provided using rm-level data for 26 transition economies.
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