Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment rules, including uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, a monotone pure strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists when bidders are risk-neutral with independent multi-dimensional types and interdependent values. In fact, all mixed strategy equilibria are ex post allocationand interim expected payment-equivalent to MPSE. Thus, for standard expected surplus / revenue analysis, there is no loss restricting attention to monotone strategies. JEL classification numbers: D44, D62, D82.
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