Blocking Efficacy of Small Coalitions in Myopic Economies
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider a continuum economy with infinitely many commodities and show that, for any positive =, the core of the economy coincides with the set of allocations which are not blocked by any coalition with measure less than =. Actually, our main result is an extension of Grodal's (1972, Econometrica 40, 581 583) result and, therefore, Schmeidler's (1972, Econometrica 40, 579 580) result to economies whose commodity space is l , for myopic preferences. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51. 2000 Academic Press
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 93 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2000