A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zeromonotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 148 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013