Flights towards defection in economic transactions
نویسنده
چکیده
We show that Lévy distributed variations of payoffs in the prisoner's dilemma game impede cooperation as the frequency of rare events increases. Lévy flights thus facilitate defection, but also uphold the evolutionary process, arguably maintaining a healthy level of competitiveness amongst the agents. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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