Managerial Overconfidence , Agency Problems , Financing Decisions and Firm Performance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Corporate Financial Policies With Overconfident Managers∗
There is wide debate over the causes and ultimate importance of the pecking order and debt conservatism to firm financing decisions. We argue that these empirical patterns are not driven solely by firmand market level variation, but are also linked to individual managerial characteristics. We relate the reluctance of (some) managers to access external capital markets, and particularly equity ma...
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