Imperfect Monitoring in Communication Networks1
نویسنده
چکیده
Individuals in many social networks imperfectly monitor other individuals’ network relationships. This paper shows that, in a model of a communication network, imperfect monitoring leads to the existence of many ine cient equilibria. Reasonable restrictions on actions or on beliefs about others’ actions can, however, eliminate many of these ine cient equilibria even with imperfect monitoring. Star networks, known to be e cient in many settings, are shown to have desirable monitoring characteristics. More generally, this paper provides a formal framework in which to study incorrect perceptions as an equilibrium phenomenon in social networks. JEL Nos.: A14, C72, D20, D80.
منابع مشابه
Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using Lehrer’s (Math. Operations Res. (1992) 175) result for correlated equilibria. The main result of this ...
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