Van Fraassen : Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism
نویسنده
چکیده
The notion of literal construal divides anti-realists into two kinds: the kind who say that science aims to be true when construed non-literally; and kind van Fraassen belongs to, who say that while theories should be literally construed, they don’t have to be true. The first kind of anti-realist might claim e.g. that the theory of phlogiston and the modern theory of combustion say the same thing, whereas the second kind of anti-realist would claim that those two theories say totally different things.
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