An Axiomatic Characterization of the Borda Mean Rule
نویسندگان
چکیده
Given a preference profile, a social dichotomy function partitions the set of alternatives into a set of approved alternatives and a set of disapproved alternatives. The Borda mean rule approves all alternatives with above-average Borda score, and disapproves alternatives with below-average Borda score. We show that the Borda mean rule is the unique social dichotomy function satisfying neutrality, reinforcement, faithfulness, and the quasi-Condorcet property.
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