Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing for Metric Fault Tolerant Facility Location
نویسندگان
چکیده
In the context of general demand cost sharing, we present the first group-strategyproof mechanisms for the metric fault tolerant uncapacitated facility location problem. They are (3L)-budget-balanced and (3L · (1 +Hn))-efficient, where L is the maximum service level and n is the number of agents. These mechanisms generalize the seminal Moulin mechanisms for binary demand. We also apply this approach to the generalized Steiner problem in networks.
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