Holdup, Search and Inefficiency

نویسنده

  • Shingo Ishiguro
چکیده

This paper investigates the holdup problem in the dynamic search market where buyers and sellers search for their trading partners and specific investments are made after match but before trade. We show that frictionless (competitive) market imposes severe limitations on attainable efficiencies: Markets with small friction make the holdup problem more serious than those with large friction because in any equilibrium, whether stationary or non–stationary, investment must be dropped down to the minimum level and trade must be delayed with positive probability.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Eulerian simulation of bubble columns reactors and effect of various parameters on the gas holdup

Gas holdup and bubble size are important parameters for simulation and designing in bubble column reactors. Because based on these parameters, the available gas-liquid interfacial area is defined for mass transfer. In this paper, the results of applying magnetic fields on the velocity field and volume fraction of gas holdup are reported. Hydrodynamics of the bubble column in the reactors is inv...

متن کامل

Contracting with Third Parties

odels of bilateral contracting, such as the canonical holdup model, typically assume that third parties are not available. Given this assumption, the equilibrium outcome is not first-best efficient if contracts can be renegotiated. To be more specific, suppose an architect and a builder must cooperate to build a building. The quality of the building will depend on three things: the quality of t...

متن کامل

Opportunism in Sequential Investment Settings: On Strategies for Overcoming Holdups and Holdouts

Economic theory suggests that, although the holdup and holdout problems arise in different contexts and are typically treated as disparate, they represent the same underlying economic problem. In particular, both involve an up-front investment that reduces the investor’s bargaining power with the seller of a necessary input and thereby lead to under-investment. This paper explores the implicati...

متن کامل

Holdup and hiring discrimination with search friction

A holdup problem on workers’ skill investment arises when employers can adopt discriminatory hiring norm to extract higher than socially optimal profit. In such an economy, productivity (skills) and non-productivity oriented characteristics (discrimination) both matter when determining which worker has priority. The resulting firms’ preference is an intertwined ranking order, by virtue of which...

متن کامل

Prediction of Dispersed Phase Holdup in Scheibel Extraction Columns by a New Correlation

In this study, the effect of operating parameters on dispersed phase holdup in liquid-liquid extraction process has been investigated. Three chemical systems (Toluene/Water, Butyl acetate/Water, and n-Butanol/Water) were utilized and holdup was considered in a wide range of interfacial tensions through a Scheibel extraction column. Various rotor speeds were examined on the certain velocities of...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2007