Clarity and the grammar of skepticism1

Why ever assert clarity? If It is clear that p is true, then saying so seems at best superfluous. Barker and Taranto (2003) and Taranto (2006) suggest that asserting clarity reveals information about the beliefs of the discourse participants, specifically, that they both believe that p. The belief theory of clarity makes a number of accurate predictions, including that It is clear that p fails to entail p (perhaps contrary to initial impressions). However, the belief theory is both too weak and too strong: belief is not sufficient to guarantee clarity (It is clear that God exists), and clarity is possible without belief (It is reasonably clear that p). I will suggest that It is clear that p means instead (roughly) ‘the publicly available evidence justifies concluding that p’. What asserting clarity reveals is information concerning the prevailing epistemic standard that determines whether a body of evidence is sufficient to justify a claim. If so, then the semantics of clarity constitutes a grammatical window into the discourse dynamics of knowledge and skepticism. 1. THE PARADOX OF ASSERTING CLARITY Imagine a photograph of a woman wearing a white lab coat with a stethoscope around her neck, and then consider uttering either (1) or (2): (1) It is clear that Abby is a doctor. (2) Abby is a doctor. Why ever assert (1) instead of (2)? 1Thanks to Jim Pryor and to the participants at the 4th Workshop on Discourse Structure in Austin Texas in 2006. 1