Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments among Players

نویسندگان

  • Matthew O. Jackson
  • Simon Wilkie
چکیده

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding o ers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to eÆcient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others. JEL classi cation numbers: C72, D72, D78, H41, K12

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, princip...

متن کامل

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Learning Dynamics in Mechanism Design: an Experimental Comparison of Public Goods Mechanisms

In a repeated-interaction public goods economy, dynamic behavior may affect the efficiency of various mechanisms thought to be efficient in one-shot games. Inspired by results obtained in previous experiments, the current paper proposes a simple best response model in which players’ beliefs are functions of previous strategy profiles. The predictions of the model are found to be highly consiste...

متن کامل

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Network Architecture, Salience and Coordination

This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation of monotone games with imperfect information. Players are located at the nodes of a network and observe the actions of other players ∗This research was supported by the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS) and the UC Berkeley Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab). The paper has benefited from suggest...

متن کامل

Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study

a Center for Experimental Social Sciences, New York University, United States b California Institute of Technology, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Mail code 228-77, Pasadena, CA 91125, United States c Mathematica, 111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 920, Chicago, IL 60601, United States d New York University, 19 W 4th Street, New York, NY 10012, United States e University of British Colum...

متن کامل

Nber Working Paper Series Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study

Measurement error is ubiquitous in experimental work. It leads to imperfect statistical controls, attenuated estimated effects of elicited behaviors, and biased correlations between characteristics. We develop simple statistical techniques for dealing with experimental measurement error. These techniques are applied to data from the Caltech Cohort Study, which conducts repeated incentivized sur...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2002