Quaternary dichotomous voting rules

نویسندگان

  • Annick Laruelle
  • Federico Valenciano
چکیده

In this paper we provide a general model of ‘quaternary’dichotomous voting rules (QVRs), namely, voting rules for making collective dichotomous decisions (to accept or reject a proposal), based on vote pro…les in which four options are available to each voter: voting (‘yes’, ‘no’or ‘abstaining’) or staying home and not turning out. The model covers most of actual real-world dichotomus rules, where quorums are often required, and some of the extensions considered in the literature. In particular, we address and solve the question of the representability of QVRs by means of weighted rules and extend the notion of ‘dimension’of a rule. JEL Classi…cation: C71, D71

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Social Choice and Welfare

دوره 38  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2012