Understanding Thomas Reid

Thomas Reid offers a powerful challenge to Hume and his skeptical system. In “Thomas Reid on Epistemic Principles,” William Alston gives an explanation of that challenge and concludes in favor of a Reidian-inspired thesis. I argue, however, that Alston’s thesis is a diluted version of Reid’s radical position, one that Reid’s principles cannot accommodate. Thus, I conclude that, because Alston’s position is not available, we are left with Reid’s radical thesis, with which we are rightly uncomfortable. Thomas Reid gives a deep and important challenge to Hume and his skeptical system. In “Thomas Reid on Epistemic Principles,” William Alston offers an explanation of that challenge and concludes in favor of a Reidian-inspired thesis. That thesis is, namely, that there is no reasonable approach to knowledge other than to simply accept the outputs of our basic faculties, except where there is sufficient reason to reject a particular belief.1 I follow Alston’s presentation of Reid’s challenge to Hume, but depart on the resulting thesis: I argue that Reid is more radical, or less compromising, than Alston records, and that this resulting position is not satisfactory. Hume argued to many skeptical theses, and Reid very often concluded in opposition to him. For instance, Hume argued that we have no adequate idea of power at all. Reid, on the other hand, concludes that “we have some degree of 1 William P. Alston, “Thomas Reid on Epistemic Principles,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 2.4 (1985): 448.