Logical and Analytic Truths That Are Not Necessary∗
نویسنده
چکیده
The notions of logical truth, analytic truth, and necessary truth are extremely important in philosophy. A logically true sentence remains true no matter what the interpretation of the nonlogical constants. An analytically true sentence is true in virtue of the meanings of its words. Necessarily true sentences are true in all possible worlds. The concepts involved in these definitions are central to philosophy, and it is of the utmost importance that philosophers chart their interactions and examine where and how the distinctions among them evolve. Many philosophers agree that logical truths are analytic, since they are true in virtue of the fixed meanings of the logical constants. Examples like “All bachelors are unmarried” demonstrate that not all analytic truths are logically true, for though this sentence is true in virtue of the standard interpretation (meaning) of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’, there may be interpretations of these terms in which this sentence is false. Many philosophers also agree that there are necessary truths which are not logically true. Paradigm cases of such are identity statements of the form ‘a = b’ where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are both names (or logical constants). But many philosophers regard all logical and analytic truths as paradigm cases of necessary truths. After
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