Interim Outcomes and Bargaining Solutions
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we employ a uni ed approach to Nashs two-person bargaining problem by using a class of axioms, which we term Common Disagreement Point (CDP) axioms. These axioms describe under what circumstances parties that expect to face sometimes uncertain nested or non-nested bargaining sets can reach interim outcomes. By doing so, these axioms portray a bargaining process, and thereby bridge the gap between cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining; some of these axioms are also conducive to de ning the relative bargaining power of parties via relative gains and concessions. We show that the bargaining process could lead to the Discrete Rai¤a, Nash or Kalai/Smorodinsky solutions depending on when parties, who face uncertain bargaining compromises, are willing to reach interim outcomes. JEL classi cation: C78; D74
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