Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions: A Survey on the Partition Function Approach
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper surveys the recent literature on the endogenous formation of economic coalitions, in particular, the partition function literature that allows for externalities across coalitions. Various economic coalitions are classified either as coalitions with positive externalities (output cartels, R&D coalitions with spillovers, public-goods (environmental) coalitions, free-trade areas) or as coalitions with negative externalities (joint ventures with efficiency gains, customs unions). I review several games of coalition formation (the Single Coalition Formation game, the Open Membership game, the Exclusive Membership game, the Coalition Unanimity game, the Equilibrium Binding Agreements game) and examine equilibrium coalition structures in these games.
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