Five Indefinitely Repeated Games in the Laboratory

I experimentally test play in five indefinitely repeated games: a hawk-dove game, a game of chicken, a trust game, a coordination (stag-hunt) game, and a constant-sum game. I compare the different game histories that affect decision making in each of the games. I find that the common game history relevant to decision-making across all but the constant-sum game is consistent with the strategy tit-for-tat. keywords: experimental economics, repeated games, infinite games, social dilemmas, cooperation, coordination. JEL classification nos. C91, C73. Contact Information: Department of Economics, 855 Sherbrooke St. W., McGill University, Montreal, QC, H3A 2T7, Canada, e-mail: [email protected], tel.: (514) 398-1559; fax: (514) 398-4938. Acknowledgements: I thank Sara Constantino and Julie Héroux for research assistance. I thank the Social Science and Humanities Research Council, the Centre for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organizations (CIRANO) for funding, and the Bell University Laboratory in Electronic Commerce and Experimental Economy for use of the experimental laboratory.