Inference-Proof Updating of a Weakened View Under the Modification of Input Parameters

We treat a challenging problem of confidentiality-preserving data publishing: how to repeatedly update a released weakened view under a modification of the input parameter values, while continuously enforcing the confidentiality policy, i.e., without revealing a prohibited piece of information, neither for the updated view nor retrospectively for the previous versions of the view. In our semantically ambitious approach, a weakened view is determined by a two-stage procedure that takes three input parameters: (i) a confidentiality policy consisting of prohibitions in the form of pieces of information that the pertinent receiver of the view should not be able to learn, (ii) the assumed background knowledge of that receiver, and (iii) the actually stored relation instance, or the respective modification requests. Assuming that the receiver is aware of the specification of both the underlying view generation procedure and the proposed updating procedure and additionally of the declared confidentiality policy, the main challenge has been to block all meta-inferences that the receiver could make by relating subsequent views.