Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment
نویسندگان
چکیده
We report a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase cooperation. JEL Classification: C72, C92, C93.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 45 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015