Epistemic Dispositions. Reply to Turri and Bronner
نویسندگان
چکیده
We reply to recent papers by John Turri and Ben Bronner, who criticise the dispositionalised Nozickian tracking account we discuss in “Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know.” We argue that the account we suggested can handle the problems raised by Turri and Bronner. In the course of responding to Turri and Bronner’s objections, we draw three general lessons for theories of epistemic dispositions: that epistemic dispositions are to some extent extrinsic, that epistemic dispositions can have manifestation conditions concerning circumstances where their bearers fail to exist, and that contrast is relevant to disposition attributions.
منابع مشابه
Epistemic Dispositions
In Briggs and Nolan 2012, we suggested that advocates of a Nozickian tracking theory of knowledge might do well to appeal to dispositions rather than counterfactuals. (Gundersen 2003 and 2010 makes a similar suggestion, though he prefers a dispositional account of counterfactuals that enables him to retain a conditional tracking analysis.) John Turri (2012) and Ben Bronner (2012) have offered a...
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