Fuzzy Epistemicism∗

It is taken for granted in much of the literature on vagueness that semantic and epistemic approaches to vagueness are fundamentally at odds. If we can analyze borderline cases and the sorites paradox in terms of degrees of truth, then we don’t need an epistemic explanation. Conversely, if an epistemic explanation suffices, then there is no reason to depart from the familiar simplicity of classical bivalent semantics. I question this assumption, showing that there is an intelligible motivation for adopting a many-valued semantics even if one accepts a form of epistemicism. The resulting hybrid view has advantages over both classical epistemicism and traditional manyvalued approaches. ∗I presented versions of this paper in June 2007 at the Arché Vagueness Conference in St. Andrews, Scotland, and the LOGICA Conference in Hejnice, Czech Republic. I am grateful to audiences at both conferences for their comments, and particularly to Dorothy Edgington, my commentator at St. Andrews. I would also like to thank Branden Fitelson, Michael Caie, Fabrizio Cariani, Elijah Millgram, Stephen Schiffer, Mike Titelbaum, and two anonymous referees for useful correspondence. †Department of Philosophy, University of California, 314 Moses Hall, Berkeley, CA 947202390. Email: [email protected].