Which Future for Neuroscience in Forensic Psychiatry: Theoretical Hurdles and Empirical Chances

NeuroscieNce Data aND ForeNsic Psychiatric examiNatioN: oPPortuNities, threats, aND LimitatioNs oF the curreNt Debate Almost all of the world’s legal systems assume that criminal responsibility cannot be established if the defendant was not capable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his/her actions (1). Furthermore, most Western Penal Codes assume that the defendant cannot be convicted if he/she is considered unable to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the antijuridical fact, and/or if he/she is unable to control his/her urges, impulses, or responses. If a subject lacked these abilities, then courts may use statements such as “not guilty by reason of insanity,” “incapacitated person,” or “(partial) mental insanity” (2). Recent developments of neuroscience in clinical practice have lead to consider the potential role of neuroscience data for assessing criminal responsibility in forensic psychiatric examination (FPE) (3). In the literature, opportunities, threats, and limitations of the introduction of neuroscience in FPE have been widely debated (4, 5). It has been proposed that the use of neuroscience data in FPE may, at least in some circumstances, support the detection of such disabilities. Conversely, it has been also stressed the potential misleading role of neuroscience data in courts. Traditionally, the debate focused on four major issues: