Selecting Strategies for Infinite-Horizon Dynamic LIMIDS

نویسندگان

  • Marcel van Gerven
  • Francisco Javier Díez
چکیده

In previous work we have introduced dynamic limited-memory influence diagrams (DLIMIDs) as an extension of LIMIDs aimed at representing infinite-horizon decision processes. If a DLIMID respects the first-order Markov assumption then it can be represented by 2TLIMIDS. Given that the treatment selection algorithm for LIMIDs, called single policy updating (SPU), can be infeasible even for small finite-horizon models, we propose two alternative algorithms for treatment selection with 2TLIMIDS. First, single rule updating (SRU) is a hill-climbing method inspired upon SPU which needs not iterate exhaustively over all possible policies at each decision node. Second, a simulated annealing algorithm can be used to avoid the local-maximum policies found by SPU and SRU.

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تاریخ انتشار 2006