Statistical mechanics of budget-constrained auctions

نویسندگان

  • Fabrizio Altarelli
  • Alfredo Braunstein
  • John Realpe-Gomez
  • Riccardo Zecchina
چکیده

Finding the optimal assignment in budget-constrained auctions is a combinatorial optimization problem with many important applications, a notable example being the sale of advertisement space by search engines (in this context the problem is often referred to as the off-line AdWords problem). Based on the cavity method of statistical mechanics, we introduce a message passing algorithm that is capable of solving efficiently random instances of the problem extracted from a natural distribution, and we derive from its properties the phase diagram of the problem. As the control parameter (average value of the budgets) is varied, we find two phase transitions delimiting a region in which long-range correlations arise.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • CoRR

دوره abs/0903.2429  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2009