Exact Procedures for Envy-free Chore Division
نویسندگان
چکیده
We develop the rst explicit procedures for exact envy-free chore division for 4 or more players. We also give a simple 3-person procedure. Our 4-person moving-knife scheme and n-person discrete algorithm are accomplished by exploiting a notion of \irrevocable advantage" for chores, and are motivated by similar solutions for cake-cutting by Brams, Taylor, and Zwicker. We discuss the diierences between cake-cutting and chore division and additional problems encountered in chore division.
منابع مشابه
N-person Envy-free Chore Division
In this paper we consider the problem of chore division, which is closely related to a classical question, due to Steinhaus [7], of how to cut a cake fairly. We focus on constructive solutions, i.e., those obtained via a well-defined procedure or algorithm. Among the many notions of fairness is envy-freeness: an envy-free cake division is a set of cuts and an allocation of the pieces that gives...
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