An Algorithm for Computing Stochastically Stable Distributions with Applications to Multiagent Learning in Repeated Games

نویسندگان

  • John R. Wicks
  • Amy Greenwald
چکیده

One of the proposed solutions to the equilibrium selection problem for agents learning in repeated games is obtained via the notion of stochastic stability. Learning algorithms are perturbed so that the Markov chain underlying the learning dynamics is necessarily irreducible and yields a unique stable distribution. The stochastically stable distribution is the limit of these stable distributions as the perturbation rate tends to zero. We present the first exact algorithm for computing the stochastically stable distribution of a Markov chain. We use our algorithm to predict the long-term dynamics of simple learning algorithms in sample repeated games.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

A Multiagent Reinforcement Learning algorithm to solve the Community Detection Problem

Community detection is a challenging optimization problem that consists of searching for communities that belong to a network under the assumption that the nodes of the same community share properties that enable the detection of new characteristics or functional relationships in the network. Although there are many algorithms developed for community detection, most of them are unsuitable when ...

متن کامل

Leveraging Repeated Games for Solving Complex Multiagent Decision Problems

Making good decisions in multiagent environments is a hard problem in the sense that the presence of several decision makers implies conflicts of interests, a lack of coordination, and a multiplicity of possible decisions. If, then, the same decision makers interact continuously through time, they have to decide not only what to do in the present, but also how their present decisions may affect...

متن کامل

Multiagent Reinforcement Learning in Stochastic Games

We adopt stochastic games as a general framework for dynamic noncooperative systems. This framework provides a way of describing the dynamic interactions of agents in terms of individuals' Markov decision processes. By studying this framework, we go beyond the common practice in the study of learning in games, which primarily focus on repeated games or extensive-form games. For stochastic games...

متن کامل

Blind Signal Separation Using an Extended Infomax Algorithm

The Infomax algorithm is a popular method in blind source separation problem. In this article an extension of the Infomax algorithm is proposed that is able to separate mixed signals with any sub- or super-Gaussian distributions. This ability is the results of using two different nonlinear functions and new coefficients in the learning rule. In this paper we show how we can use the distribution...

متن کامل

Multiagent Social Learning in Large Repeated Games

This thesis studies a class of problems where rational agents can make suboptimal decisions by ignoring a side effect that each individual action brings to bear on the common good. It is generally believed that a mutually desirable strategy can be enforced as a stable outcome for rational agents if the imminent threat exists that any deviator from the strategy will be punished. This thesis expa...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2005