Sources of Immunity to Error through Misidentification

In this paper I wish to draw attention to a feature of judgments expressible using indexical terms such as I, here and now and the significance this feature has for discussions of Immunity to Error through Misidentification (IEM). The feature in question is this: consider a subject who sincerely expresses a belief using an utterance of the form 'λ is F', where 'λ' is an indexical term. Suppose 'λ' refers to some object O (where an 'object' could be a place, time, or person as well as a physical object). Then the subject believes, of O, that it has the property F. Call this the stated belief. But the use of the indexical term 'λ' indicates that the subject also believes something else about O; something associated with the use of that indexical term. Call this the manifested belief. Someone who believes that the race starts now, for example, believes, of time t, that the race starts at t; but their use of 'now' indicates that they believe something else about t. Let U be the utterance of the race starts now. Then the subject also believes, of t, that t is simultaneous with U. For any indexical term there will be some such belief concerning the relation between the reference and the utterance token. As Prior (1959) pointed out, however, this would not account for the significance, for action, of believing that the race starts now; for one can correctly believe, at any time t', that t is simultaneous with U, without this having any special significance for one's immediate actions. So perhaps the subject must also believe something else about t; most plausibly, something we might express by saying that t is present. It is the latter kind of manifested belief that will be of interest to us. Similarly, someone who sincerely states that the race starts here believes, of a place p, that the race starts at p; but also believes that p is where I am (though I shall suggest below that this belief can take an unarticulated form, analogous to believing that a place is near or far). At any rate, I shall take it as a working hypothesis that all singular indexical judgments (other than those expressed