Testing substitutability of weak preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test substitutability of weak preferences. Interestingly, the algorithm is faster than the algorithm of Hatfield et al. by a linear factor on the domain of strict preferences.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Mathematical Social Sciences
دوره 66 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013