Non-Cooperative Public-Good Provision and Productivity Differentials
نویسندگان
چکیده
We explore the generality of Konrad and Lommerud (1995)’s Rotten Spouse Theorem. While the result holds for an arbitrary number of agents, it fails to hold for general technologies. We discuss some of the implications for CO2-emissions models.
منابع مشابه
Public-Good Productivity Differentials and Non-Cooperative Public-Good Provision
We explore the generality of Konrad and Lommerud (1995)’s Rotten Spouse Theorem. While the result holds for an arbitrary number of agents, it fails to hold for general technologies. We discuss some of the implications for CO2-emissions models.
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