Andrei Gomberg . César Martinelli . Ricard Torres Anonymity in large societies
نویسنده
چکیده
In a social choice model with an infinite number of agents, there may occur “equal size” coalitions that a preference aggregation rule should treat in the samemanner.We introduce an axiom of equal treatment with respect to ameasure of coalition size and explore its interaction with common axioms of social choice. We show that, provided the measure space is sufficiently rich in coalitions of the same measure, the new axiom is the natural extension of the concept of anonymity, and in particular plays a similar role in the characterization of preference aggregation rules.
منابع مشابه
Anonymity in large societies
We formalize the notion of coalition measure as a primitive of social choice with a countably infinite number of agents. An example would be a dynamic setting with an infinite horizon, where it may be convenient to consider separately each individual’s preferences at every moment of time. In this setting, there are some “equal size” coalitions that a social choice rule should treat in the same ...
متن کاملSmallness of Invisible Dictators
Fishburn (1970) showed that in an infinite society Arrow’s axioms for a preference aggregation rule do not necessarily imply a dictator. Kirman and Sondermann (1972) showed that, in this case, nondictatorial rules imply an invisible dictator that, whenever the agent set is an atomless finite measure space, can be viewed as the limit of coalitions of arbitrarily small size. We show first that, w...
متن کاملHow many sorting equilibria are there ( generically ) ? ∗
It is shown that in a generic two-jurisdiction model of the type introduced by Caplin and Nalebuff (1997), the number of sorting equilibria (with jurisdictions providing distinct policies) is finite and even.
متن کاملThe Role of Media Slant In Elections and Economics
We formalize the concept of media slant as a relative emphasis on di¤erent issues of political interest by the media, and we illustrate the e¤ects of the media choice of slant on political outcomes and economic decisions in a rational expectations model. In a two-candidate election, if the media is biased in favor of the underdog, then it will put more emphasis on issues with a large electoral ...
متن کاملCENTRO DE INVESTIGACIÓN ECONÓMICA Discussion Papers Series Vote Revelation: Empirical Characterization of Scoring Rules
In this paper I consider choice correspondences defined on an extended domain: the decisions are assumed to be taken not by individuals, but by committees and, in addition to the budget sets, committee composition is observable and variable. For the case of varying committees choosing over a fixed set of two alternatives I provide a full characterization of committee choice structures that may ...
متن کامل