Optimal Commitment Policy under Noisy Information ∗
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper studies an advantage of commitment over discretion when a central bank observes only noisy measures of current inflation and output, in the context of an optimizing model with nominal-price stickiness. Under a commitment regime, if current policy turns out to be too expansionary (contractionary) because of the bank’s information problem, subsequent policies should be slightly contractionary (expansionary). By following this approach, the central bank can improve the trade-off between the fluctuations of its goal variables caused by economic shocks and their fluctuations caused by the bank’s response to measurement error. JEL classification: E31; E52
منابع مشابه
ECB Working Paper No. 12
The optimal weights on indicators in models with partial information about the state of the economy and forward-looking variables are derived and interpreted, both for equilibria under discretion and under commitment. An example of optimal monetary policy with a partially observable potential output and a forward-looking indicator is examined. The optimal response to the optimal estimate of pot...
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