Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes

نویسندگان

  • Dirk Sliwka
  • Christian Grund
  • Christine Harbring
  • Bernd Irlenbusch
  • Matthias Kräkel
  • Tom McKenzie
  • Georg Nöldeke
چکیده

Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These ‘conformists' have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too. When there is asymmetric information about the distribution of preferences (the `social norm'), the incentive scheme offered or autonomy granted can reveal a principal's beliefs about that norm. High-powered incentives may crowd out motivation as pessimism about the norm is conveyed. But by choosing fixed wages or granting autonomy the principal may signal trust in a favorable social norm. JEL Classification: M52, J33, D23

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تاریخ انتشار 2006