The Hermeneutic Study of Moral Action and Moral Development

In the past decade radical changes have occurred in our understanding of the character of moral beliefs, precepts, and prescriptions, and how these are or can be justified. Profound changes have also taken place in our view of the nature of scientific inquiry, particularly in the human sciences, and how scientific knowledge claims can be justified. These changes reflect a larger transition between two very different ways of comprehending ourselves and our world: the modern and postmodern epochs. A book such as this can play a role in deciding the direction that psychology takes in this time of transition, through reflection upon the framework we have become accustomed to. An appreciation of the need for such reflection in the sciences of humanity can be seen in the growing frequency of metatheoretical analyses (e.g., Fiske & Shweder, 1986; Stam, Rogers & Gergen, 1987). Such metatheoretical discourse considers how we have come to ask the questions we ask in our consideration of psychological phenomena; the background assumptions we take for granted in our inquiry and what, on the other hand, is overlooked; the persistent problems that hamper our investigations; and the likely results of modifying our course of inquiry.